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Abstract
We ask whether offering a menu of unemployment in-
surance contracts is welfare improving in a heterogeneous
population. We adopt a repeated moral-hazard framework
as in Shavell/Weiss (1979) supplemented by unobserved
heterogeneity about agents’ job opportunities. Our main
theoretical contribution is an analytical characterization
of the sets of jointly feasible entitlements that renders an
efficient computation of these sets feasible. Our main eco-
nomic result is that optimal contracts for ”bad” searchers
tend to be upward-sloping due to an adverse-selection ef-
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ing time-profile of benefits in pure moral hazard environ-
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1 Introduction
People flowing into unemployment are heterogeneous with respect
to their chances of finding a new job. These differences include
different innate ability, general education, human capital accumu-
lated on the the last job and their unemployment history. Also,
chances of reemployment generally vary over different segments
of the labor market. Typically, workers searching for a job are
better informed about their job opportunities than a government
agency in charge of providing unemployment insurance (UI). This
asymmetric information may prevail due to unobservable charac-
teristics or because it is too costly to elicit information. The liter-
ature on optimal unemployment insurance generally neglects this
unobserved heterogeneity [Karni (1999) provides a comprehensive
overview].1 It mainly focuses on the trade-off between setting in-
centives to search and insurance aspects of providing benefits to a
representative agent.2 This is remarkable since self-selection from
a menu of contracts is common practice when dealing with het-
erogeneous populations in the design of health insurance or car
insurance markets.
In this paper, we ask whether offering a menu of unemployment
insurance contracts is welfare improving and what the optimal
contracts look like. We adopt a multi-period contract theoretical
framework, introduced by Shavell and Weiss (1979) and later re-
fined and simulated by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997). We extend
their representative agent framework to encompass heterogeneity
in the job search technology, i.e., we introduce types of agents
that differ with respect to their probability of finding a job when
controlling for search effort. We compute the optimal menu of UI
contracts offered by a UI agency from which each agent selects his
preferred contract.
As HN, our paper technically builds on recursive solutions of re-
peated games and principal-agent problems as analyzed in the pa-
pers by Spear and Srivastava (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990),
1Exceptions are Mortensen (1983) and Wang and Williamson (2002). For
a discussion see below.
2Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) and Meyer (1995) survey the empirical
literature that documents disincentive effects from providing UI.
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Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) [APS], Atkeson and Lucas
(1992) and Chang (1998). However, our combination of adverse
selection with repeated moral hazard has not been studied yet. Fur-
thermore, concerning the adverse selection problem, agents’ types,
which parameterize their chances of finding a job, are drawn only
once but affect their chances in all future periods. This assumes
that differences in the ability of finding a job are permanent. Al-
though we assume full commitment, there is no ”natural” way to
state such a problem recursively. The permanent heterogeneity in
our model implies that the first period is distinct from the follow-
ing periods. Both the adverse selection incentive constraints and
the entitlement constraints in the principal’s problem have to hold
only in the first period whereas moral hazard incentive constraints
hold in every period. As in Fernandes and Phelan (2000) addi-
tional state variables that restrict the planner’s choices have to be
added.This choice has to ensure that the problem remains compu-
tationally tractable. We include the remaining expected life-time
utility guaranteed by a contract to an agent as state variables, one
for each type. To keep track of the incentive constraints we add, for
each type, the remaining expected life-time utility if he had chosen
a different contract. We then proceed in two steps. First we give
separate recursive formulations of cost minimization problems for
each type. This generates optimal contracts implementing previ-
ously specified entitlements. Second we state the overall problem
by merging these separate cost minimization problems.
In the numerical solution procedure we face a well-known dif-
ficulty in the recursive contracts literature building on the APS
methodology, namely the efficient calculation of the sets of ”sus-
tainable outcomes”.3 Our main theorem provides a precise ana-
lytical characterization of the set of sustainable outcomes in our
setup. This characterization renders a numerical implementation
feasible. In particular, we prove certain topological properties of
the set of sustainable outcomes that ensure an efficient computa-
tion that considerably improves in terms of accuracy upon previous
algorithms [compare e.g. section 8 of Chang (1998)].
3This terminology was introduced by APS. It describes the sets of contracts
that are implementable taking into account future choices which again have
to take into account initial choices and so on and so forth.
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Our main theorem allows us to compute the optimal menu of UI
contracts numerically and thus to answer the following questions.
First, under which circumstances will it be optimal to offer only
one UI contract to all agents - a situation that resembles real world
UI schemes in most countries? We can show (under fairly general
conditions) that in the optimum separating contracts should be
offered. Second, are all optimal UI contracts decreasing, as in the
representative-agent setup [for an overview, see Fredriksson and
Holmlund (2003)]? We investigate the shape of optimal contracts
in a framework where two types of agents (good and bad) face dif-
ferent hazard rates of finding a job (given a certain search effort).
We show that the contract for the good searcher has a decreasing
benefit profile, as the one he would be offered in a pure moral
hazard environment. In contrast, the contract of the bad searcher
will tend to have an upward-sloping benefit profile. Finally, we
provide a comparative-statics analysis of changes in various pa-
rameters and give a detailed intuition of our results.
In the optimal-UI literature the issue of adverse selection has
been raised first by Mortensen (1983) who applies the seminal
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) paper to UI. His analysis is, how-
ever, static and does not include search incentives. Wang and
Williamson (2002) present a numerical welfare analysis of UI in
a dynamic economy with moral hazard and heterogeneous agents.
Their focus is the effect of (full and partial) experience rating on
optimal UI. In contrast in our model agents choose from a set of
different UI contracts offered by the principal. Hopenhayn and
Nicolini (2001) address the issue of heterogeneity of agents in a
two period model of UI similar to their earlier work. They assume,
however, that the agents’ type is observable and contractible.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the model is
introduced and our assumptions are motivated. In section 3 the
analytical results are presented. In section 4 the model is solved
numerically; we also present an extensive comparative statics exer-
cise. Section 5 discusses various possible extensions of our model.
Proofs are given in the appendix.
3
2 Model
Our framework for analyzing UI is a dynamic principal-agent model.
The principal represents the government (or UI agency) providing
social insurance.
The agents’ problem The agents are unemployed workers search-
ing for a job. There is a continuum of agents, modelled by the
unit interval. The agents are of two types, differing in their op-
portunities of finding a new job. The differences between the two
types of agents in their search technology is expressed by agent
i’s probability of remaining unemployed pi(a), that is a function
of the search effort a he exerts (we will sharpen the notion of het-
erogeneity formally below). They have private information about
their types. The fraction of agents of type B (”bad searcher”) q
and of type G (”good searcher”) 1 − q are common knowledge.
Except for the difference in search technologies (as formalized be-
low) we assume that agents are identical. In particular, we assume
that both agents are equally risk-averse, they enjoy the same util-
ity u(.) from consumption. Also, we assume that once an agent
has been employed, he will keep his job with a fixed wage rate w
until his death in period T .4 We can thus calculate an employed
agent’s total expected lifetime utility in period t as:
Wt =
T∑
l=t
βl−tu(w),
where β is the common discount factor.
Unemployed agents receive possibly time-varying UI benefits.
We denote by bt the benefit received in period t. Given any bene-
fit scheme {b1, ..., bT}, the agent chooses his search effort at in any
period in which he is unemployed. In his decision to increase his
search effort he faces a trade-off between increasing search costs on
4Technically, the assumption that both agents get the same wage is in no
way important for our analysis, it is introduced for the sake of simplicity.
In the solution to our model we could keep track of the impact of different
wages for B and G on the search incentives; qualitatively, the results would
not change.
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the one hand and an increasing reemployment probability on the
other. The total lifetime utility he expects when remaining unem-
ployed is the key variable determining this decision. We denote by
V it+1 an unemployed agent’s total expected lifetime utility in period
t + 1, where i = B,G. Moreover, in the sequel we will denote by
zt = u(bt) the utility value of consuming benefit bt. Thus we can
state agent i’s problem (i = B,G) in period t recursively by:
V it = maxa
zt − a + β[pi(a)V it+1 + (1− pi(a))Wt+1], (1)
where we assumed that effort enters utility linearly. Recall that
Wt+1 is an employed agent’s expected lifetime utility where em-
ployment starts in t + 1. We denote by aˆit the decision of agent
i:
aˆit = argmaxa zt − a + β[pi(a)V it+1 + (1− pi(a))Wt+1]. (2)
The principal will have to take into account the decisions by the
agents when designing contracts for them. These constraints are
moral hazard incentive constraints, (MH-IC).
The principal’s problem The principal’s objective is to min-
imize the cost of providing a certain ”level” of insurance by the
design of (a menu of) optimal contracts for the agents. Hereby
the current cost function c(.) is the inverse of the agent’s utility
function: c(zi) ≡ u−1(zi) = bi. We will call {zi1, ..., ziT} a con-
tract designed for agent i (with i = B,G). We will often use the
terms contract b and contract g to denote the contracts designed
for agents B and G respectively. Agents choose one contract from
the offered contracts in period 0. We assume that the principal
can fully commit to the contract promised in period zero. The
following property of c(.) is implied by monotonicity and strict
concavity of an agent’s utility function u(.), i.e. risk aversion.
Condition 2.1 The cost function c(.) is increasing and strictly
convex.
In his minimization problem, the principal has to take into con-
sideration the different reemployment probabilities of the agents.
Furthermore, he has to take into account the following constraints:
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First, as mentioned above, he has to take into consideration the
agents’ decision problem, i.e. the moral hazard incentive con-
straints. Second, the principal has to guarantee incentive compat-
ibility due to adverse selection, i.e., he has to ensure that each
agent chooses the contract designed for him. Third, he has to re-
spect the entitlement V (i.e. total expected lifetime utility) the
contracts should at least guarantee to agent B and G respectively.
This entitlement can be interpreted as the ”level of insurance” the
principal is willing to guarantee. Any value of the entitlement V
can be mapped one-to-one to a ”certainty equivalent replacement
rate”, i.e., to a percentage of the wage w which is consumed every
period and which provides lifetime utility of exactly V . This in-
terpretation will be used to calibrate reasonable values of V later.
The principal’s problem can thus be stated as:
min
{zB1 ,...,zBT },{zG1 ,...,zGT }
q[c(zB1 ) + βpB(aˆ
B
1 )[c(z
B
2 ) + βpB(aˆ
B
2 )[c(z
B
3 ) + ...]...]] +
(1− q)[c(zG1 ) + βpG(aˆG1 )[c(zG2 ) + βpG(aˆG2 )[c(zG3 ) + ...]...]]
subject to the entitlement constraints (EC)
V b,B1 ≥ V , (3)
V g,G1 ≥ V , (4)
and the adverse selection incentive constraints (AS-IC)
V b,B1 ≥ V g,B1 , (5)
V g,G1 ≥ V b,G1 . (6)
The hat on the a’s describing the choices of effort of the agents,
aˆ, indicate that the principal respects the moral hazard incentive
constraints (MH-IC).
In the formulation of the principal’s problem, V j,it denotes total
expected lifetime utility in period t for the unemployed agent i (i =
B,G) if he selects contract j (j = b, g). The superscript j indicates
for which agent the contract is designed, i.e., contract b is designed
for agent B and contract g for agent G. A priori both agents
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can of course choose either contract before period 1. The AS-
IC constraints ensure that they will in fact choose the contract
designed for them. The EC constraints guarantee that the chosen
contract gives the promised utility. Both the V j,it s and the aˆ
i
ts can
be calculated recursively from the array of equations 1 and 2 given
a contract.
Remark 2.2 If agents are homogeneous in their search costs, i.e.
they all have the same pi(a), then the setup is identical to the one
considered by Shavell and Weiss (1979) (except for the finite time
dimension).
To make our problem interesting, the initial entitlements to
total expected lifetime utility have to be below the total lifetime
utility from work. If the entitlements V i,jt are higher than Wt for
any period posterior to one in that the unemployed agents exert
search effort, the efforts would necessarily be zero, and thus the
probability of remaining unemployed pi would be 1.
Condition 2.3 The utility entitlement of the unemployed agent
is below the one guaranteed by lifetime work: V < W1.
We will see in the sequel that this condition guarantees that all
optimal V i,jt are smaller than Wt.
Formalization of the Agents’ Heterogeneity Now we for-
malize in detail the idea that agents differ in their reemployment
probabilities. To develop the model model formally we first make
some standard technical assumptions on the pi(.) functions.
Condition 2.4 The probability of remaining unemployed pi(a) of
agent i:
1. Smoothness: pi(a) ∈ C∞(R).
2. Monotonicity and strict Convexity: p′i(a) < 0, p
′′
i (a) > 0.
3. Boundary conditions: pi(0) = 1, lima→∞ pi(a) = 0.
4. Inada conditions: lima→0 p′i(a) = −∞, lima→∞ p′i(a) = 0.
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Condition 2.4 ensures that the agents’ problem (1) always has
a unique interior solution that can be characterized by a first order
condition.
The basic difference between the two types of agents in their
search technology is expressed by agent i’s probability of remaining
unemployed pi(a), that is a function of the search effort a he exerts:
Condition 2.5 Given the same effort, type B has a higher prob-
ability of remaining unemployed than type G: pB(a) > pG(a).
Condition 2.6 (Spence-Mirrlees property)
∂V Bt
∂zt+s
− ∂V
G
t
∂zt+s
> 0 (7)
for all t with 1 ≤ t ≤ T and s with 1 ≤ s ≤ T − t.
Condition 2.6, which is standard in classical contract theory, sharp-
ens the basic concept of a bad or good searcher. It implies that -
faced with the same contract - the bad searcher may exert a higher
search effort than the good searcher under this contract, but his
effort will not be so high that his chance of finding a job exceeds
the good searcher’s chance:
Lemma 2.7 Condition 2.6 holds if and only if agents facing the
same contract {z1, ..., zT}, in equilibrium exert efforts such that
pB(aBt ) > pG(a
G
t ).
Condition 2.4 to 2.6 will be used in all results that follow. For
our first result - on the optimality of separating the types - we
need one more assumption on pi(.). As we mentioned above, con-
dition 2.4 ensures that the agent’s choice of effort from (1) can be
characterized by the following first order condition:
p′i(a
i
t) =
1
β(V it+1 −Wt+1)
. (8)
Equation (8) establishes a one-to-one and smooth relation between
V it and a
i
t. We can therefore define the following function for the
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next-to-last period:
pii(zT ) ≡ pi(aiT−1) = pi
(
(p′i)
−1
(
1
β(zT − u(w))
))
So pii(zT ) is agent i’s probability of remaining unemployed when
facing benefit utility zT in the last period. It is clear that pii is
increasing. We formulate a condition on the elasticity of pii with
respect to zT , which - of course - implicitly puts restrictions on
the choice of pi(.).
Condition 2.8 1. The marginal probability of remaining un-
employed ∂pii(z)∂z of agent i facing promised utility z is greater
for agent G than for agent B:
∂piG(z)
∂z
>
∂piB(z)
∂z
2. If the marginal probabilities ∂pii(z)∂z of agent G and B are equal
for two utility values zG and zB, then the utility of G, zG,
must be smaller than the utility of B, zB:
∂piG(zG)
∂z
=
∂piB(zB)
∂z
⇒ zG < zB.
What is the economic content of Condition 2.8? The first part
says that agent G reacts more strongly to a change in the promise
z than agent B. In other words: The probability of finding a new
job depends more critically on the UI benefit promise in the case
of agent G than in the case of agent B. Note that here we compare
agents G and B that face the same contract. The second part of
condition 2.8 says, that whenever the reaction is equal, then agent
G must face a lower promise than agent B. Summarizing condition
2.8 we can say that the ”incentive sensitivity” of agent G is higher
than the one of agent B.
What role do conditions 2.6 to 2.8 play in our analysis? The
model presented in this paper incorporates two different paradigms,
hidden information and (repeated) hidden action. Condition 2.6
is the typical technical assumption in hidden information models.
Condition 2.8 is a condition that ensures in our setup a feature of
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(pure) repeated hidden action that has been analyzed numerically
in Pavoni (2000) and discussed in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2001):
In the full information case the decline of the UI benefits over time
is sharper for better searchers. Loosely speaking, conditions 2.6
and 2.8 ensure that our model exhibits the ”standard” behavior of
a pure hidden information model and a pure hidden action model.
We will see in section 4 that both conditions will be met in our
functional specification of our simulation.
3 Theoretical Results
In this section we develop a characterization of the solution to the
principal’s problem. First, we will however turn to a standard
question in contract theory.
Pooling is Not Optimal The first question we ask is whether
and under what circumstances it is actually optimal to offer two
contracts in order to screen the agents. The answer gives a first in-
dication that it may indeed be relevant to consider the cost saving
potential of a differentiated UI.
Proposition 3.1 There exists a solution to the Principal’s Prob-
lem. If Condition 2.8 holds, any solution is separating.
What makes the theorem very appealing from a more applied
perspective is the fact that our numerical implementation with
CRRA utility shows that the good searcher typically reacts more
sensitively (in the sense of condition 2.8) to the search incentives
than the bad searcher. Considering this numerical result as robust
we could claim that the UI agency has a definite potential for
cost-saving by switching from offering only one to offering two UI
contracts.
But what should the optimal contracts look like? The answer
to this question is not evident: We can neither apply Shavell and
Weiss (1979) solution directly, since we should expect the influence
of hidden information on the optimal design of the contracts, nor
can we apply standard solutions of adverse selection models that
do not incorporate repeated hidden action. Moreover we cannot
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hope to find a direct recursive formulation of the problem, because
both the adverse selection incentive constraints and the entitle-
ment constraints in the principal’s problem have to hold only in
the first period.
The Solution of the Model In the sequel, we develop a char-
acterization of the solution to the principal’s problem in Proposi-
tions 3.2, 3.4 and 3.8. The strategy is as follows: We first look at
each contract separately ignoring for a moment the issue of self-
selection. In Proposition 3.2 we give a recursive formulation of the
problem of finding a cost-minimizing contract that provides agent
B and agent G with two arbitrarily specified levels of ex-ante life-
time utility (a pair of first-period entitlements) if both of them
choose this contract. The goal of this proposition is to summarize
the cost minimization problem in a compact way, i.e., to give two
separate recursive formulations, one for each contract. In this for-
mulation the pairs of entitlements (one pair for each contract) and
their evolution over time serve as state variables of the problem
(compare HN).
The question left open by proposition 3.2 is which pairs of en-
titlements are actually jointly feasible under a given contract (still
ignoring the issue of self-selection). The answer to this question
has to take into account the choices of effort by the agents in-
duced by the contract under consideration as well as the laws of
motion for the entitlements. Proposition 3.4 gives a precise the-
oretical and numerically useful description of the correspondence
Γt mapping pairs of entitlements of the agents today (V Bt , V
G
t ) to
jointly feasible policy options (zt, V Bt+1, V
G
t+1), i.e., the benefit to-
day and the entitlements for tomorrow. This proposition is the
main theoretical result of the paper and serves as the cornerstone
of our recursive numerical implementation. We can now calculate
the cost of a given contract that provides agents with any feasible
pairs of first period entitlements.
Finally, we return to address the issue of self-selection. We
merge the two separately solved cost minimization problems and
state the original adverse selection problem faced by the principal
as a four-dimensional minimization problem in the (two pairs of)
entitlements of the first period. In Proposition 3.8 we further
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simplify the minimization problem by showing that the entitlement
constraint of G must be slack, and that the entitlement constraint
of B and the adverse selection incentive constraint of G must be
binding at the solution. This reduces the dimension of the problem
from four to two which allows us to solve the problem with high
numerical accuracy.
We begin the characterization of the solution by the recursive
formulation of contract b, i.e. the contract designed for agent B. Of
course contract g can be described similarly. As usual in adverse
selection problems, we anticipate that only agent B will choose
contract b in the end and thus stochastically discount costs at his
rate. For the time being, the lifetime (or first period) entitlements
of contract b for agent B and agent G, V b,B and V b,G, are taken
as given. Their optimal values for given entitlement constraints
(EC) from the original problem will be calculated in Proposition
3.8 below. The recursive formulation takes the form of a (finite-
dimensional) Bellman Equation: The principal minimizes the costs
of paying out a benefit worth zt (in utility units) today and promis-
ing entitlements V b,Bt+1 and V
b,G
t+1 for tomorrow. In doing so, he has
to observe the entitlements of B and G today, V b,Bt and V
b,G
t , that
serve as state variables of the problem. A law of motion connects
the state and the choice variables. We denote the set of possi-
ble choices (zt, V
b,B
t+1 , V
b,G
t+1 ) in state (V
b,B
t , V
b,G
t ) by Γt(V
b,B
t , V
b,G
t ).
This correspondence will be characterized later in Proposition 3.4.
Moreover, the choices of effort ait from the agents’ problem facing
the promised entitlement V it+1 for tomorrow, i.e. the MH-IC, are
taken as given by the principal. The recursive formulation is com-
pleted by two boundary conditions: The first period entitlements
V b,B1 and V
b,G
1 of course have to equal the promised ex ante lifetime
utilities V b,B and V b,G respectively. In the last period, the enti-
tlements V b,BT and V
b,G
T have to take the value of the last period
benefit zT . To see this, recall that we consider agents who chose
the same contract, namely contract b. So both get a benefit of zT
in the last period. But in the last period, unlike all other periods,
there is no way of splitting the promise for that period into a ben-
efit in that period and a promise one period later because there is
no period later.
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Thus we can state the following proposition without proof:5
Proposition 3.2 (Recursive Formulation of Contract b) The
cost functions for contract b, guaranteeing an ex ante lifetime util-
ity of V b,B to agent B and V b,G to agent G, has the following
recursive form:
CBt (V
B
t , V
G
t ) = min{zt,V Bt+1,V Gt+1}∈Γt(V Bt ,V Gt )
c(zt)+βpB(a
B)CBt+1(V
B
t+1, V
G
t+1)
(9)
subject to
Law of motion for contract b (LOM)
zt − aB + β[pB(aB)V Bt+1 + (1− pB(aB))Wt+1] = V Bt
zt − aG + β[pG(aG)V Gt+1 + (1− pG(aG))Wt+1] = V Gt ,
Choice of effort in contract b (MH-IC)
aB = argmaxa zt − a + β[pB(a)V Bt+1 + (1− pB(a))Wt+1]
aG = argmaxa zt − a + β[pG(a)V Gt+1 + (1− pG(a))Wt+1],
as well as the boundary conditions
V B1 = V
b,B (10)
V G1 = V
b,G (11)
V BT = zT (12)
V GT = zT . (13)
The correspondence Γt maps into the values of jointly feasible zt,
V Bt+1, V
G
t+1 given the pair of entitlements (V
B
t , V
G
t ).
Remark 3.3 Of course the contract g for agent G takes the same
form as contract b for agent B in Proposition 3.2, whereby neces-
sary adaptations in the entitlements etc. are obvious.
5A proof by induction over T is straightforward. The recursive formulation
can thus be understood as a way of summarizing terms in the principal’s
problem above.
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In order to make use of Proposition 3.2, we actually have to be
able to calculate the correspondence Γt(., .) as precisely as possi-
ble. This is particularly important for any numerical application
of the recursive formulation. The following proposition gives a
characterization of theoretical properties of Γt that are indispens-
able for a satisfactory approach to calculate Γt numerically. For
technical reasons we distinguish between the case where the utility
zt from consuming the UI benefit is bounded from below from the
case where it is not. We will discuss this and other issues after
stating the proposition.6
Proposition 3.4 (Characterization of Γt) The following for-
mulas characterize the correspondence Γt(V Bt , V
G
t ), that gives all
feasible policy options for given entitlements V Bt and V
G
t in period
t. Note that we allow for a lower bound z on the utility value of
the benefit zt. The reason will be explained in Remark 3.5.
1. Be t ≤ T and let zt ≥ z (where z may take the value −∞).
Then there exists a lower bound V G and so that for V G ≤
V Gt ≤ Wt:
Γt(V
B
t , V
G
t ) =
{
{zt(a), V Bt+1(a), V Gt+1(a)}a∈[a,a](V Bt ,V Gt ) : V Bt ∈ [V Bt (V Gt ), V
B
t (V
G
t )]
∅ : else
(14)
The jointly feasible values zt(a), V Bt+1(a) and V
G
t+1(a) are dif-
ferentiable functions.
The boundary functions a(V Bt , V
G
t ), a(V
B
t , V
G
t ) and V
B
t (V
G
t ),
V
B
t (V
G
t ) are continuous. They are depend on the value of z.
For V Gt below V
G, the correspondence Γt(V Bt , V
G
t ) is the
empty set.
2. In period T − 1 the correspondence ΓT−1(V BT−1, V GT−1) takes
the same form as in 1 with only one possible parameter value
a, i.e. only one choice {zT−1(a), V BT (a), V GT (a)}.
6The notation a ∈ [a, a](V Bt , V Gt ) means that the boundaries a and a are
functions a(V Bt , V Gt ) and a(V Bt , V Gt ).
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We have two technical remarks on Proposition 3.4.
Remark 3.5 The upper bound Wt on V Bt is artificial: Of course
the principal can ensure lifetime utilities above the value of secure
lifetime income from work. However, this cannot be optimal, since
it reduces the search effort to zero, and in view of Condition 2.3
we exclude lifetime utilities above Wt from our considerations.
Remark 3.6 The lower bound on zt in Proposition 3.4 is intro-
duced for technical reasons: Some utility functions map onto the
real line R, some only onto the half-line R+. An example of the
former kind are CARA utility functions, one of the latter CRRA
utility functions with risk aversion smaller than one.
With Proposition 3.4 at hand, we can define precisely the no-
tion of feasibility in our model: A pair of entitlements (V Bt , V
G
t )
is called jointly feasible if the set Γt(V Bt , V
G
t ) is non-empty.
Let us now be more specific why this proposition is so impor-
tant for our purposes. Models including repeated moral hazard,
as ours, have been discussed in the framework of a strand of litera-
ture building on Spear and Srivastava (1987), Thomas and Worrall
(1990), Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) [APS], Atkeson and
Lucas (1992) and Chang (1998). We are not bound to provide a
detailed discussion of this literature, the following remark, how-
ever, relates proposition 3.4 to it.
Remark 3.7 The sets of jointly feasible entitlements are the finite-
dimensional analogue of the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs
(of the agents’ game) in the infinite-dimensional framework of
APS or the set of sustainable outcomes in the (again infinite-
dimensional) framework of Chang (1998).
By introducing entitlements, marginal utilities or sequential
equilibrium outcomes as state variables - instead of ”intuitive”
state variables - we inevitably run into the difficulty of defining
precisely the sets of possible values these state variables can take.
APS and Chang (1998) characterize these sets as the largest fixed
point of a set operator. Moreover, they show that the fixed point
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can be obtained by a fixed-point iteration of sets. This is theo-
retically sound. However, it does not provide an entirely satisfac-
tory description of the sets nor the definite algorithm to calculate
them numerically, in particular if the state space is more than one-
dimensional. In fact, the numerical determination of these sets
may be a tricky issue in simulations of models building on these
methods. In Proposition 3.4 we give - for our model - a satisfactory
description of the sets of the state variables: The boundaries of the
sets are continuous functions. In particular, the sets are compact,
connected and contractible. In the next section we will point out
that this is crucial for the numerical implementation of our solu-
tion. Moreover, Proposition 3.4 states that the principal’s choice
problem in a given period is essentially one-dimensional (in the
sense that the correspondence describes a smooth one-dimensional
path in the three-dimensional real space with this path being pa-
rameterized in a).7
After this methodological digression, we return to the solution
of the principal’s problem. Given proposition 3.2 it can be stated
as follows:
min
V b,B ,V b,G,V g,B ,V g,G
qCB1 (V
b,B, V b,G) + (1− q)CG1 (V g,B, V g,G)(15)
s.t. Γ1(V
b,B, V b,G) *= ∅ (16)
Γ1(V
g,B, V g,G) *= ∅ (17)
V b,B ≥ V g,B (18)
V g,G ≥ V b,G (19)
V b,B ≥ V (20)
V g,G ≥ V . (21)
This is a four dimensional minimization problem, and thus still
rather complex. However, as in the case of standard adverse selec-
tion problems (compare e.g. the book by Laffont and Martimort
(2002), Chap. 2), we are able show that agent B’s entitlement con-
straint and agent G’s adverse selection incentive constraint must
be binding, and that agent G’s entitlement constraint must be
slack at the solution. And so we finally characterize the solution
7Except for the next-to-last period, where there is only one choice left.
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to the principal’s problem as follows:
Proposition 3.8 (Solution of the Principal’s Problem) For
values of V that are not too low, solutions to the principal’s prob-
lem are solutions to the simplified problem:
min
V g,B ,V g,G
qCB1 (V , V
g,G) + (1− q)CG1 (V g,B, V g,G)
s.t. V ≥ V g,B
The qualification ”not too low” is needed to avoid corner solu-
tions. In the simulation we found that all values of V correspond-
ing to reasonable levels of insurance were high enough (compare
the proof in the appendix and footnote 9 in Section 4.1).
Two Corollaries Two corollaries ensue from proposition 3.8.
The set-up considered by Shavell and Weiss (1979) will be our
benchmark, i.e. a set-up where the principal knows the type of
the agent and sets the benefits to give optimal search incentives.
We will call it the pure moral hazard environment. About the
contract for type B we learn:
Corollary 3.9 Type B receives the minimal entitlement utility V .
His contract is distorted with respect to the optimal contract in a
pure moral hazard environment such that its value V b,G for type G
is reduced.
In the case of the contract for type G, we deduce:
Corollary 3.10 1. Type G receives an information rent, i.e.
the utility V g,G that his contract provides him with is greater
than V .
2. If the adverse selection incentive constraint of the bad searcher
(18) is slack at the solution, his contract is identical to the
optimal contract in the pure moral hazard environment (given
the level of entitlement V g,G).
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In our numerical simulations, we found that the adverse selection
incentive constraint of the bad searcher 18 was always slack.
We thus recover the rent extraction/efficiency trade-off from a sim-
ple adverse selection model without moral hazard (cf. chapter 2 of
Laffont and Martimort (2002)), where efficiency here is the search
efficiency of agent B.
The corollaries provide first economic insights as to how the un-
employment agency should design optimal UI contracts. Further
economic aspects will be discussed after a simulation of optimal
contracts in the next section.
4 Simulation
4.1 Computational Strategy
The simulation closely follows Proposition 3.2, Proposition 3.4 and
Proposition 3.8 in Section 2. The first part of the simulation calcu-
lates the correspondence Γt by backward induction. As in Propo-
sition 3.4, we use the entitlement of agent G V Gt as a parameter
for the upper and lower bound on the entitlement V Bt for agent B.
We introduce a grid on V Gt and then calculate the bounds on V
B
t
by a bracketing procedure.
More precisely, for a given tuple (V Bt , V
G
t ) of state variables, we
check whether the corresponding path of choice variables (zt(a), V Bt+1(a), V
G
t+1(a))
(compare the proof of Proposition 3.4, Appendix C) intersects the
set of jointly feasible values (zt, V Bt+1, V
G
t+1) as determined in the
previous induction step. As defined in the previous section, by
”jointly feasible” we refer to tuples (V Bt+1, V
G
t+1) such that Γt+1(V
B
t+1, V
G
t+1)
is non-empty; in the case of zt, we only have to check whether it
is above the lower bound z. By proposition 3.4, we know that for
each V Gt (within the limits of feasible entitlements for G) there
exits a V Bt (V
G
t ) and V
B
t (V
G
t ) that limits the range of V
B
t jointly
feasible with V Gt . Since for every V
G
t the set of jointly feasible
V Bt is one interval, we can ”encircle” V
B
t (and, separately, V
B
t ) by
values of V Bt above and below and then calculate the bound by
a (highly precise) bracketing procedure. It is thus proposition 3.4
that guarantees that our algorithm calculates a characterization
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of the set of jointly feasible entitlements (V Bt , V
G
t ) by stating that
the set of jointly feasible entitlements (V Bt+1, V
G
t+1) is compact and
connected.
As we have pointed out in the preceding section (compare re-
mark 3.7 and the following discussion), the virtue of proposition
3.4 lies in a more ”precise” characterization of the sets of jointly
feasible entitlements (the set of ”sustainable outcomes” in the ter-
minology of Chang (1998)). It is exactly here in the numerical
algorithm where this characterization becomes useful: The de-
scription of the set of sustainable outcomes as a fixed-point of a
set-operator by APS is mathematically precise, but poses a serious
precision problem in numerical applications with more than one
state variable (compare the discussion in section 8 of Chang).
The second part of our numerical procedure uses the recursive
formulation in Proposition 3.2. It calculates a numerical approxi-
mation of the cost functions Cit(V
B
t , V
G
t ) based on a solution of the
minimization problems in the backward induction of the principal.
More precisely, we cover the domain of Cit (i.e. the set of
jointly feasible entitlements (V Bt , V
G
t ) for which Γt(V
B
t , V
G
t ) is
non-empty) by a large grid. For each tuple (V Bt , V
G
t ) in the grid
(”states of the world”), we solve the minimization problem along
the path of choice variables (zt(a), V Bt+1(a), V
G
t+1(a)), i.e. we solve
it in a. Ignoring the exact value of the limits a and a, we use a
bracketing procedure in which we allocate an extremely high cost
to a values delivering choice variables outside the set of feasible
values. Note that we make use of the characterization of Γt in
two ways: First, we rely on the fact that the set of jointly feasible
entitlements (V Bt , V
G
t ) is compact and contractible
8. Second, we
exploit the reduction of the number of choice variables from three
(zt, V Bt+1, V
G
t+1) to one a.
Finally, each cost function is then approximated as a linear
combination of complete Chebychev polynomials by regression (for
this standard procedure, compare Judd (1998), Chapters 6.4, 6.12
and 12.8).
8If it were not contractible there could be holes in the set of jointly feasible
state vectors (V Bt , V Gt ) and we would have to split up the minimization path
into several parts - a tedious and hardly tractable task.
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In the third part, the approximated cost functions Ci1 are com-
bined in the objective function of the principal’s problem. Ac-
cording to proposition 3.8, we have to solve a two-dimensional
minimization problem 9.
After an initial grid search, the solution is calculated by a
Nelder-Mead multidimensional minimization procedure.
4.2 Calibration of the Model
In our calibration, we work with a monthly interval. Therefore
we set the discount rate to β = 0.995 which corresponds to an
annual discount rate of 0.95. The overall time-spell is a year,
i.e. the number of periods is set to T = 12. As for the probability
function, we choose pi(a) = 1−
√
1− exp(−θia), where θi remains
to be determined. We use CRRA utility functions u(b) = b
1−γ
1−γ , as
common in the UI literature.
Needless to say, the corresponding cost function c(.) = u−1(.)
meets the convexity condition 2.1:
c(z) = zα,
where α = 11−γ ≥ 1. Also, Conditions 2.4, 2.6 and 2.8 are ful-
filled by the probability function pi(a) 10. So in particular, in our
numerical setup the prerequisites of Theorem 3.1 hold.
In the benchmark case, following HN, we set α = 2 (i.e. risk
aversion γ = 12), which corresponds to intermediate risk aversion
on behalf of the agents.
The wage is normalized to be w = 100, so that unemployment
benefits become equal to replacement rates. The lower bound on
the UI benefits is set to z = 0, the lowest possible value taken by
CRRA utility functions with 0 < γ < 1. As in the proofs to the
propositions, in our simulation we have normalized utility from
9 There is one point to take care of, though: In order to apply proposition
3.8, we have to ensure that the minimal entitlement V is so high that z1 > z
(compare the proof in Appendix C). We ran alternative minimization routines
for low values of V , showing that the assertion holds.
10Our probability function pi(a) has a slightly more intricate functional
form than the one used by HN (pHN (a) = 1− exp(−ra)). We have chosen it
because the latter does not fulfill the Inada condition (cf. Condition 2.4).
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consuming the wage to zero, i.e. all expected lifetime utilities are
negative.
We have finally chosen the parameters θ1 = 0.007 and θ2 =
0.017 to match reasonable escape rates from unemployment in
autarky (compare Meyer (1990)): For type B, the bad searcher,
this is then 22.7% per month, for type G, the good searcher, it is
35.8% per month. As a comparison: HN assume a weekly escape
rate in autarky of 10% as an average for the US, which corresponds
to a monthly escape rate of 34.4%. Other choices of parameters
will be discussed in the next section, where we give a detailed
comparative statics analysis.
Our first figures, figure 2 to 5, show how the set of feasible
entitlements becomes larger and larger along the backward in-
duction. Figures 6 to 14 show optimal UI contracts for different
levels of entitlements to the agents and for different values of q,
the share of the first agents in the population. The entitlement
bounds chosen are V = −20, −25, −30 and −35 (also denoted in
the legend). This corresponds to a certainty equivalent of 68.67%,
61.76%, 55.21% and 49.03% of the wage per period respectively,
i.e. the utility of an (unemployed) agent who consumes X% of the
wage for all periods and cannot gain employment.11
4.3 Results
In this section we will explore the dependence of the optimal con-
tracts on different choices of parameters. Since we know that
Theorem 3.1 applies, all solutions are separating. Moreover, for
all parameter values we have looked at the incentive constraint
of agent B, equation 18 was slack. For contract g designed for
the good searcher G this means according to Corollary 3.10 that
it is identical to the one considered by Shavell and Weiss (1979).
From their paper (compare also HN and Pavoni (2000)) we know
that in our setup the optimal contract for the good type G has a
falling benefit profile, induced by moral hazard; and this property
11In the cases of V = −20,−25 the UI benefits for agent G exceed a re-
placement rate of 100% in the first periods. This reflects the fact that our
model does not incorporate effects of UI on work effort and its impact on
employment.
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is reflected by our figures. Changes in the parameter values do
not qualitatively change contract g; the falling benefit profile is
robust, as our theory predicts (for a detailed numerical discussion
of the comparative statics of the contract in a pure moral hazard
environment see Pavoni (2000)). However, the level of entitlement
for G (and so, in particular, his information rent) varies with the
parameters of our model.
We will thus concentrate our discussion on contract b and the
information rent for G. The shape of contract b is determined by
two effects:
1. a moral hazard effect (MH), arising as in the case of type G
from the agents’ search problem,
2. an adverse selection effect (AS), arising from the principal’s
wish to lower the value of the contract for type G (compare
Corollary 3.9) in order to separate the type types.
We know that in the pure MH environment, benefit schemes
are falling. What would agent B’s contract look like in a pure
AS environment? As a pure adverse selection environment, we
consider a set-up where the type of an agent is still hidden infor-
mation, but the probabilities of remaining unemployed of type B
and G are fixed constants pB > pG. This is then a typical ad-
verse selection problem as discussed in Chapter 2 of Laffont and
Martimort (2002). Due to the assumption of full commitment, the
dynamics of the contracts is rather simple. Now, as in the case of
the full problem (Cf. Corollary 3.10), agent G receives an informa-
tion rent, and, given the entitlement V g,G, his contract is the first
best contract. In the pure AS case, this means his consumption is
fully smoothed. Trivially, the following Spence-Mirrlees property
holds (as in the full problem):
∂V Bt
∂zt+s
− ∂V
G
t
∂zt+s
> 0 ∀s ≥ 1.
Therefore, in order to separate the two types, the contract for
agent B has to show an increasing benefit scheme.12
12A formal derivation of the solution to the principal’s problem in a pure
adverse selection environment is available upon request.
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Information Rents
V Certainty Equivalent q = 0.2 q = 0.5 q = 0.8
-35 49.03 10.8 % 18.1 % 22.2 %
-30 55.21 7.3 % 13.9 % 17.0 %
-25 61.76 4.8 % 10.5 % 12.9 %
-20 68.67 3.1 % 7.2 % 9.9 %
(rents expressed as percentage increase over minimal entitlement)
Table 1: Information Rents obtained by agent G
Elasticities σp of agent B
V Certainty Equivalent θB = 0.004 θB = 0.007 θB = 0.010
-35 49.03 0.0070 0.0116 0.0167
-30 55.21 0.0075 0.0131 0.0188
-25 61.76 0.0079 0.0139 0.0199
-20 68.67 0.0083 0.0146 0.0209
Table 2: Elasticities of unemployment probability w.r.t. benefit
level for agent B
So should we expect the benefit scheme for agent B to be rising
or falling? Whether the MH or the AS effect dominates depends
on the choice of parameters. In the sequel, we discuss the influence
of different parameters on the relative weight of the MH and the
AS effect. As our benchmark, we use the parameterization of the
previous subsection [α = 2, θB = 0.007, θG = 0.017, q = 0.5].
The entitlement bound V For the good searcher, a decrease
in the entitlement shifts the contract uniformly downwards (fig-
ures 6-9), as can be expected.
We can also see from figures 6 to 9 that for the bad searcher the
MH effect prevails for high entitlement bounds V and thus his op-
timal contract falls as well (figure 6). But as V is lowered the AS
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effect becomes more and more important and the benefit profile
becomes hump shaped (figure 8) or even rises (figure 9).
It is interesting to note that at the same time, according to table 1
(compare also table 3 and 4), the information rent for agent G is in-
creasing as V falls. We infer that the distortion of contract b away
from the contract for B in a pure moral hazard environment (com-
pare Corollary 3.9) increases as V is lowered. So broadly speaking
we can say that the rent extraction/search efficiency trade-off is
more severe for low than for high values of V . How can this be
explained?
Let us first briefly mention a mechanism that reinforces the
MH effect as V increases but cannot fully account for the ob-
served changes in benefit profiles. As can be seen from table 2,
the elasticity of the probability of remaining unemployed σipi(z)
with respect to the UI benefits are increasing in the benefit level.
This means that at higher levels of utility a reduction of fu-
ture benefits has a greater effect on the search effort and thus the
reemployment chances of the unemployed agent. Hence the MH
effect is more likely to matter at higher levels of utility, as we see
in the figures. However, the tables show that the elasticities σipi(z)
alter only slightly as the utility V is lowered. Thus this ”elasticity
effect” alone cannot explain the changes we observe in the result
of the comparative static exercise.
The main force driving the result is the convexity of the cost
function, i.e., the fact that the marginal costs of providing a cer-
tain utility increases in the level of utility. Put in terms of the
agents’ utility function we can say that a reduction of benefits
hurts an agent disproportionately badly at a low level of utility.
So in particular, a cost neutral shift of a benefit scheme from a
flat to a bended profile comes at a greater relative loss of utility
at low utility levels than at high utility levels. Loosely speaking,
consumption smoothing is more important at low levels of utility
than at high levels.
Now we look at contract b. Its utility V b,B for agent B is fixed
at V , and so we concentrate on its value V b,G for G. As we have
pointed out above, the rent extraction/search efficiency trade-off
is reflected by the AS and the MH effect: The slope of contract b
is upward sloping in a pure AS and downward sloping in a pure
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MH environment. Assume for a moment that the elasticity of the
probability of remaining unemployed σipi(z), that determines the
importance of the MH effect, remains constant along shifts of the
entitlements (actually we have seen that the increase of σipi(z) in
z even reinforces the results). In other words: We assume for a
moment that the search efficiency of B is equal across levels of
utility.
Now according to what we have said about the preferences for flat
versus bended contracts of agents with concave utility functions,
we deduce that agent G would prefer to have his consumption
smoothed more strongly at low than at high levels of benefits.
Since his own contract g is falling, the (flatter) contract b be-
comes more attractive to him as the utility level is reduced. So in
order to ensure that the agents are separated, in equilibrium the
principal grants G a higher information rent (in relative terms, i.e.
as a fraction of his entitlement) and accepts a stronger distortion
of contract b from the pure moral hazard contract for B as V is
lowered (recall that we hold the MH effect fixed for the moment).
The distorted (upward sloping) contract b is then relatively less at-
tractive for G than for B because of the Spence-Mirrlees property,
as explained above.
The share of type B agents q Figures 10, 9 and 11 depict the
optimal contracts at the entitlement bound V = −35 (Certainty
equivalent: 49.03%) for q = 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8 respectively. As
the share of the bad searchers q increases, we see a clear shift
of contract b dominated by the AS effect to one dominated by
the MH effect. Furthermore, the contract for the good searcher
is uniformly shifted upwards. Moreover, from table 1 we can see
that his information rent rises.
We can explain these observations as follows: With a small
proportion of type B agents, the principal concentrates on low-
ering the costs of contract g. He does so by pushing down the
information rent of agent G, thus heavily distorting the value of
contract b for agent G (recall that the incentive constraint for the
good searcher binds, V b,G = V g,G). Since the value of contract b
for agent B is fixed at V , the value V b,G can only be lowered by
steeply raising the benefit scheme b. This is true because of the
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Information Rents
V Certainty Equivalent θB = 0.004 θB = 0.007 θB = 0.010
-35 49.03 20.6 % 18.1 % 14.2 %
-30 55.21 14.3 % 13.9 % 10.9 %
-25 61.76 9.7 % 10.5 % 8.2 %
-20 68.67 6.6 % 7.2 % 6.2 %
(rents expressed as percentage increase over minimal entitlement)
Table 3: Information Rents obtained by agent G
Spence-Mirrlees property.
With an increasing proportion of type B agents, reducing the
costs arising from their contract predominates the principal’s prob-
lem and the issue of paying an information rent to type G agents
looses importance. In order to keep the costs of contract b low,
the principal prefers to avoid a large distortion of V b,G away from
its first best and consequently accepts a higher information rent
paid to type G agents.
Economically speaking, with a high proportion of type G agents,
the principal wants to curb the information rent, whereas with a
high proportion of type B agents, the principal wants to ensure
the search efficiency of type B agents.
Agent B’s unemployment probability parameter θB The
parameter θB determines the search capacity of agent B: The
higher it is, the lower is his probability of remaining unemployed,
given the same search effort a. We have looked at the case where
the agents become more similar in their search technology, i.e. θB
increases while θG is held fix. In our analysis, we have therefore
kept agent G’s search parameter at θG = 0.017 and have looked
at the cases of θB = 0.004, θB = 0.007 and θB = 0.010. The latter
correspond to an escape rate in autarky of 15.6%, 22.7 and 27.7%
per month respectively. Figures 12, 8 and 13 show the optimal con-
tracts at a utility level of V = −30 (certainty equivalent: 55.21%).
From these figures we see that the AS effect prevails for low values
of θB, whereas for high values the MH effect is dominant.
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Information Rents
Certainty Equivalent α = 1.5 α = 2 α = 2.5
49.03 27.3 % 18.1 % 10.4 %
55.21 21.5 % 13.9 % 8.2 %
61.76 17.1 % 10.5 % 5.8 %
68.67 13.7 % 7.2 % 3.7 %
(rents expressed as percentage increase over minimal entitlement)
Table 4: Information Rents obtained by agent G
For the good searcher an increase in θB shifts his benefit scheme
downwards. At the same time an increase in θB implies for the
bad searcher that the AS aspect looses importance and the MH
becomes increasingly important. One reason for this can be seen
from table 2. The elasticity of the probability of remaining unem-
ployed is increased considerably as θB rises. As explained in the
paragraph on V , this means that the search incentives for agent
B are enhanced.
Risk aversion α−1α The exponent in the cost function α de-
termines the risk aversion of both agents, i.e., the coefficient of
relative risk aversion is α−1α . In this paragraph we look at the
impact of a change in risk aversion on the optimal contracts and
the information rents for type G.The results for the latter two are
shown in table 4. As is apparent from the tables we compare levels
of certainty equivalents of the unemployment entitlement bounds
rather than levels of utility (which would of course make no sense).
All other parameters are identical.
Figures 14, 6 and 15 show the optimal contracts at a replace-
ment rate of 68.67%. In these figures we make two observations.
First, the contract for type B, that is dominated by the MH ef-
fect at α = 1.5, becomes smoother as α increases. Furthermore it
slightly shifts upwards. Second, we can see that the falling con-
tract for G is shifted upwards as α increases. At the same time
his information rent falls (see table 4).
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The economic explanation for these two phenomena is straight-
forward. In our model the coefficient of relative risk aversion is
identical to the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion of consumption, i.e., more risk averse agents have a stronger
preference for intertemporal consumption smoothing. Put the
other way round: The marginal costs of guaranteeing a certain
level of instantaneous utility rise as relative risk aversion rises, so
- given that the principal guarantees a specified total expected life-
time utility - falling and rising benefit schemes become relatively
more expensive as compared to flat ones. Therefore contracts tend
to become flatter as α increases.
For agent G the contract shifts upwards because his contract
is falling. Therefore, as risk aversion increases, he needs to be
compensated by higher benefits in order to achieve a given cer-
tainty equivalent. This also explains the fall in his information
rent. Since his contract becomes disproportionately more expen-
sive in terms of benefits as α increases (recall the convexity of the
cost function), the UI agency wants to save information rent. This
mechanism resembles the fall of the information rent for G as V
increases (see above).
5 Extensions
In this section we want to discuss a number of possible extensions
of our model. A first extension concerns the (minimal) entitle-
ment V for the unemployed: It could be type-dependent. Second,
we show how to integrate the UI taxes paid after reemployment
introduced by HN. Third, we discuss the limit of the time horizon
T going to infinity.
Type Dependent Entitlement Constraint The entitlement
constraints in our model correspond technically to participation
constraints in adverse selection models analyzed in classical con-
tract theory. The case of type-dependent reservation utility in par-
ticipation constraints has been widely discussed in that context,
the most general work being the article by ?. For our purpose, we
will refer to Section 3.3.1 of Laffont and Martimort (2002). They
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distinguish between five cases, characterized by different combi-
nations of participation and incentive constraints binding at the
solution.
Clearly - given Proposition 3.8 - only the case where the min-
imal entitlement of agent G, V G, is greater than the one of agent
B, V B, i. e. V G > V B, is interesting
13. Otherwise the solution
is identical to the one we have found there. This is also the case
for V G being only slightly greater than V B; more precisely we can
raise V G up to the value of V
g,G (greater than V B by Corollary
3.10) in Proposition 3.8 without changing the results. This cor-
responds to the case 1 of Laffont and Martimort (2002). Note,
however, that we do not know whether the incentive constraint of
the bad searcher B is slack or binding at the solution (although
numerically we found that it was slack). In the first case - that
has been the resulting from our simulations - for V G = V
G,g + (
with some ( > 0 we would have a situation as in their case 2
(with both entitlement constraints and the good searchers incen-
tive constraint binding). In the second case we would face either
their case 4 (both entitlement constraints binding and type B’s
incentive constraint binding) or case 5 (type G’s entitlement type
B’s incentive constraint binding). In principle, as the wedge be-
tween V B and V G widens, we expect the entitlement constraint of
G to be binding at the solution, his contract becoming more and
more attractive for type B. In the case of a very large gap, we will
have to compensate B with an information rent for not choosing
the contract of type G, so it is G’s entitlement constraint and B’s
incentive constraint that have to be binding at the solution (case
5 of Laffont and Martimort (2002)). So the situation is reversed
with respect to Proposition 3.8: The contract for agent B takes the
same form as in the pure moral hazard environment, the contract
for G will be distorted. Note that it will be distorted downwards
to make it less attractive for agent B.
For the values of the wedge (V G − V B) in between we should
expect solutions according to case 2 to 4 of Laffont and Martimort
(2002). A precise description of the solution in analytical terms,
13As in Proposition 3.8 we will assume that that V i with i = B,G are not
too small
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i.e. a statement about constraints being binding or slack for cer-
tain ranges of parameter values, will probably be untractable due
to the highly non-linear dependence of the entitlements on basic
parameters of the problem. However, a numerical analysis should
be straightforward, because it amounts to a direct comparison of
solutions of minimization problems with different (binding) con-
straints.
Taxes on wage Shavell and Weiss (1979) analyze the optimal
allocation of UI benefits with one representative agent, HN add
taxes on labor income after reemployment to this analysis. They
make the simplifying assumption that the tax rate is fixed for the
rest of the life the moment agents have gained reemployment. In
our model we have followed Shavell and Weiss (1979), technically,
however, the extension to the framework of HN is straightforward.
By taxing (or subsidizing) labor income the principal can com-
pletely control the agent’s consumption when he is employed. The
additional ability of the principal to tax the agent can thus be cap-
tured by the introduction of entitlements while employed, Wt, that
take the role of additional state variables, and a value function for
transfers, that corresponds to the cost function in the recursive
formulation of the UI contract in the model by Shavell and Weiss
(1979). In our model we would have to introduce two additional
state variables for each contract i, W i,B and W i,G. These state
variables state the entitlement utility of an employed agent under
contract i. Given the wage rate, the transfer to the principal can
be calculated directly.
Although this extension does not seem to be complicated at
first glance, there is a problem. In the recursive formulation of
contract b (and g likewise), given by Proposition 3.2, the addi-
tional state variables enter into the cost functions of the principal
and -as choice variables- into the minimization problem in the
backward induction. While the value of the transfers after the
agent’s reemployment are easily calculated, the approximation of
the cost function poses a serious numerical problem. This is be-
cause it takes now four variables, and the curse of dimensionality
becomes a serious problem.
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Infinite Time Horizon The finite time horizon of our model
permitted us to calculate the correspondence of feasible entitle-
ments Γt(V Bt , V
G
t ) by backward induction in our simulation of op-
timal contracts. In designing the algorithm we relied in particular
on the properties of the set of jointly feasible entitlements, the sets
being compact, connected and contractible.
As in Proposition 3.2, the recursive formulation of an optimal
contract given some (V B, V G) is straightforward in the case of an
infinite time horizon:
CB(V B, V G) = min
{z,Vˆ B ,Vˆ G}∈Γ(V B ,V G)
c(z) + βpB(a
B)CB(Vˆ B, Vˆ G)
(22)
subject to:
Law of motion for contract b (LOM)
z − aB + β[pB(aB)Vˆ B + (1− pB(aB))W ] = V B
z − aG + β[pG(aG)Vˆ G + (1− pG(aG))W ] = V G
Choice of effort in contract b (CE)
aB = argmaxa z − a + β[pB(a)Vˆ B + (1− pB(a))W ]
aG = argmaxa z − a + β[pG(a)Vˆ G + (1− pG(a))W ].
This is a Bellman equation, where pairs of entitlements today
(V B, V G) are the state variables and benefit today and promises
for tomorrow are the choice variables (z, Vˆ B, Vˆ G). The value of
lifetime work is denoted by W . Once the cost functions are de-
termined, the full adverse selection problem can be stated as in
Proposition 3.8. Before this can be done, an important question
arises: How to characterize the correspondence Γ(V B, V G)?
We conjecture that the correspondence Γ(V B, V G) has the same
properties as Γt(V Bt , V
G
t ) in Proposition 3.4. In particular, the set
of jointly feasible state variables Ω = {(V B, V G)|Γ(V B, V G) *= ∅}
will be compact, connected and contractible. Since the choice
problem of the principal can be reduced in the same way to the
one-dimensional problem of choosing aG using the LOM as before,
these properties of the set of jointly feasible state variables would
guarantee that the functional form of the correspondence does not
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change when the time horizon T goes to infinity.
Here we outline a proof. It is based on the idea that the set of
jointly feasible entitlements in the case of an infinite time horizon
is the inverse limit of the sets Ωt = {(V Bt , V Gt )|Γt(V Bt , V Gt ) *= ∅}
of jointly feasible entitlements in the finite dimensional case (with
the topology being -of course- the topology of the two dimensional
real space):
Ω = lim
←
Ωt.
At the same time, given a lower bound on the one period benefit z,
we know that Ω must be bounded. Thus we obtain compactness.
To show that Ω is contractible, we need some homotopy theory.
We apply a theorem giving a hint about the first homotopy group
of Ω, pi1(Ω) (compare ?, p. 254):
0→ lim
←
pi2(Ωt)→ pi1(Ω)→ lim← pi1(Ωt)→ 0
Moreover, due to the relation between Γt and Γt+1, the natural
mapping Ωt → Ωt+1 is a fiber bundle. Therefore we conclude
that both lim← pi2(Ωt) and lim← pi1(Ωt) must vanish, yielding the
contractibility of Ω.
We thus believe that Proposition 3.4 is a technical result that
matters for dynamic programming with infinite time horizons, i.e.
for economies of the type considered in APS, Atkeson and Lucas
(1992), Chang (1998). However, we leave a precise generalization
to future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.7
Proof. Firstly, we prove that pB(aBt ) > pG(a
G
t ) ensues from the
Spence-Mirrlees-Property 7. We calculate
∂V it
∂zt+1
= βpi(a
i
t)
∂V it+1
∂zt+1
= βpi(a
i
t),
where we use the Envelope Theorem. The assertion now follows
immediately.
Secondly, assume that pB(aBt ) > pG(a
G
t ) holds. In the case where
s = 1, the Spence-Mirrlees property follows from what we have
shown above. So let s > 1. Then
∂V Bt
∂zt+s
− ∂V
G
t
∂zt+s
= βpB
∂V Bt+1
∂zt+s
− βpG∂V
G
t+1
∂zt+s
,
where we have used the Envelope Theorem once more. The asser-
tion follows by induction.
Proof of Corollary 3.9
Proof. The first assertion is point 2 in the proof of 3.8. To see the
second assertion, note that, given that V g,B is chosen optimally
for each value of V g,G, the cost function of contract g is strictly
increasing in V g,G. Moreover, in a full information optimum (i.e.
the pure moral hazard case for both contracts) the optimal V b,G
(optimal with respect to V b,B = V ) can be characterized by a first
order condition. We thus obtain a first order reduction of costs
for contract g by lowering V g,G = V b,G (constraint 19 is binding!)
below the value of V b,G in a full information optimum, whereas
there is only a second order increase in costs for contract b.
Proof of Corollary 3.10
Proof. The fact that V g,G > V has been proved in Proposition
3.8; so we look at the second assertion. In our framework, we can
recover the Shavell-Weiss contracts (i.e. the contracts from the
pure moral hazard environment) at a given level of entitlement
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V i,i by solving (i *= j):
min
V i,j
Ci1(V
i,i, V i,j)
s.t. LOM,MH − IC
and applying forward induction afterwards. This is because by
minimizing the costs of contract i with respect to its value for
agent j, we just neglect the impact of this value for the optimal
contract.
Now, if our objective function is optimized without further
restriction, we recover the optimal contract from the pure moral
hazard environment, because the value V g,B of contract g for type
B does not appear in the cost function of contract b.
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. It is clear that there is a solution to the principal’s prob-
lem. Let assumption 2.8 hold. We prove the second assertion by
contradiction: Assume that the principal’s problem is solved by
one contract p, {zP1 , ..., zPT−1, zPT }, for both agents, that generates
a total expected utility of V Bt and V
G
t in period t for agent B and
G respectively.
We have a look at the ”first best” solutions for the last two
periods that generate the same utilities V BT−1 and V
G
T−1 as p. As
”first best” solution, we refer to the solution of the pure moral
hazard problem as considered by Shavell and Weiss (1979), i.e.
the problem of guaranteeing agent i a utility of V iT−1 at lowest
cost. This is stated as follows:
minziT−1,ziT c(z
i
T−1) + βpi(a
i)c(ziT )
s.t. V iT−1 = z
i
T−1 − ai + β[p(ai)ziT + (1− p(ai))u(w)]
1 = βp′i(a
i)[ziT − u(w)]
This is the two period cost minimization problem (the principal’s
problem in this framework) in the case of agent i, subject to the
promise keeping constraint and the first order condition of the
agent’s problem, determining the choice of effort ai. Plugging
the entitlement constraint into the objective function and making
use of the envelop theorem, we calculate the following first order
conditions for the principal with respect to zT (we abbreviate pi =
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pi(ai)):
c′(zBT−1) = −
(p′B)
3
pBp′′B
c(zBT ) + c
′(zBT ) (23)
c′(zGT−1) = −
(p′G)
3
pGp′′G
c(zBT ) + c
′(zBT ). (24)
The factor of the cost function on the right-hand side is
−(p
′
i)
3
pip′′i
=
1
pii(zT )
∂pii(zT )
∂zT
,
and so we see that the RHS is identical to the relative expected
marginal cost. By condition 2.8, part 1, we know that factor of the
cost function is higher for agent G than for agent B for a given zT .
By its second part we know that this has to hold in equilibrium,
too, and so the RHS is greater for agent G than for agent B.14 We
may therefore deduce that the Shavell-Weiss contract of agent B is
flatter than its counterpart for agent G, where we define ”flatter”
in the following sense:
zGT−1
zGT
>
zBT−1
zBT
.
In the following we will dicuss the last two periods of the pooling
contract only and show that it cannot be optimal to offer it to both
agents. We will refer to the first best solutions as Shavell-Weiss
(SW) contracts.
First, suppose that the pooling contract p is flatter than the
SW contract of agent G. Then the principal can offer p and a
second contract g’ that is identical to contract p except for the
last two periods, where zPT−1 and z
P
T are substituted by z
G
T−1 and
zGT−1 from the SW contract. This is incentive compatible: Agent
G is indifferent between p and g’ by construction. Suppose that
agent B (weakly) preferred g’ over p. Then for period 1 to T−2, he
can exert the same effort ag1 to a
g
T−2 (i.e. that he chooses in the case
of contract g’) when facing contract p, and thus the stochastically
discounted utility from the benefits z1 to zT−2 is identical for both
contracts. In the last two periods, in contrast, agent B -exerting
14Note that we could weaken condition 2.8: To ensure that the RHS of G is
higher than the RHS of B it is sufficient to assume that the relative marginal
probability of remaining unemployed 1pii(z)
∂pii(z)
∂z is higher for agent G than
for agent B.
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effort optimally- gains a higher utility from the flatter contract p
than from contract g’ because of the Spence-Mirrlees property (cf.
Lemma 2.7). So agent B cannot prefer g’ over p. Offering the two
contracts p and g’ is also cheaper for the principal, because g’ is
the (unique) cost-optimizing contract for agent G during the last
two periods. Contradiction.
Second, suppose that the pooling contract p is identical to or
steeper than the SW contract of agent G. The principal then offers
p and a second contract b’ that is identical to contract p with zPT−1
and zPT substituted by z
B
T−1 and z
B
T from the SW contract. Since
the SW contract of agent B is flatter than the SW contract of
agent G, as we have seen, we can infer the contradiction in the
same way as in the first case.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof. In order to simplify the proof we introduce a normaliza-
tion: The utility from consuming the wage w is set to zero. Thus,
all Wt become zero, too, and the entitlement utilities of the un-
employed agents take non-positive values. Note that the lower
bounds for the entitlements, stemming from the lower bound on
the benefit utility z, thus shift downward each period along the
backward induction.
First, we look at the agents’ problem. Recall it takes the form
V it = maxa
zt − a + β[pi(a)V it+1 + (1− pi(a))Wt+1].
Given our normalization we obtain the following first order condi-
tion at an interior solution:
p′i(a
i
t) =
1
βV it+1
(25)
By the Inada condition in Condition 2.4 we assure that the interior
solution always applies.
The Case of t = T− 1 We start with the case of Γt(V Bt , V Gt )
with t = T − 1. Mathematically speaking, the next-to-last period
is different from the previous ones in that there is an additional
constraint on the choice variables V iT : The boundary conditions
12, 13, namely V BT = V
G
T = zT . This is the very reason why, given
the pair of state variables (V BT−1, V
G
T−1), there is only one choice left
for the principal. First, let’s look at the Law of Motion (LOM) for
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the state variables V BT−1 and V
G
T−1:
zT−1 − aBT−1 + βpB(aBT−1)V BT = V BT−1,
zT−1 − aGT−1 + βpG(aGT−1)V GT = V GT−1,
where we will drop the time index from the effort variables aiT−1.
In the following, we will denote the difference between the entitle-
ments of the agents by:
∆t := V
G
t − V Bt . (26)
With this new notation and remembering both our normalization
and V iT = zT , we solve the LOM for zT−1, equalize both equations
and solve for ∆T−1:
∆T−1 = aB − aG + βpG(aG)zT − βpB(aB)zT (27)
We want to further simplify equation 27. In the next to last pe-
riod, the first order condition of the agents’ problem 25 takes the
following form
p′B(a
B) = p′G(a
G) =
1
βzT
. (28)
Again by Condition 2.4, the p′i are strictly increasing functions
p′i : (0,∞) −→ (−∞, 0).
Remark .1 Given Condition 2.3, the principal will never promise
an entitlement above Wt (= 0 under our normalization), since at
Wt the agents stop searching (i.e. ait = 0) and their probability of
remaining unemployed becomes pi(ait) = 1.
Thus in particular V iT = zT < 0.
¿From this we deduce that the p′i are one-to-one and onto.
Therefore the following function γ(aG) is well defined:
γ(aG) := (p′B)
−1 ◦ p′G(aG).
Now we have everything at hand to define ∆T−1 as a function of
aG:
∆T−1(aG) = γ(aG)− aG + pG(a
G)− pB(γ(aG))
p′G(aG)
(29)
In order to show point 3 of Proposition 3.4, we have to show
that ∆T−1(.) is invertible.
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We do so by proving:
∆′T−1(a
G) > 0. (30)
Using the agents’ first order condition 25 and
γ′(aG) =
p′′G(a
G)
p′′B(γ(aG))
we calculate
∆′T−1(a
G) = [pB(γ(a
G))− pG(aG)] p
′′
G(a
G)
(p′G(aG))2
. (31)
By Condition 2.4 we know that p′′G(.) > 0, and since pB(γ(a
G)) >
pG(aG) by Condition 2.6 assertion 30 follows.
Finally we observe that -again by Condition 2.4-
lim
aG→0
∆T−1(aG) = 0. (32)
Together with 30 we deduce that as agent B’s entitlement V BT−1
approaches agent G’s one V GT−1, the effort of the agent G a
G (as
well as the effort of agent B) go to zero. Because of 25 this means
that the benefit for the last period zT has to converge to zero, i.e.
the wage consumption utility.
Summarizing our results so far, we can state the following:
Given entitlements V BT−1 and V
G
T−1 such that ∆T−1 ≥ 0, we can
find a unique corresponding choice of effort by agent G aG (for
the time being, we neglect the lower bound z on the benefits zt).
From this we can calculate -uniquely- the choice of effort by agent
B aB and the benefit for the last period zT from equation 25, and
the benefit of the next to last period zT−1 from LOM. All these
functions are differentiable. As ∆T−1 goes to zero, the benefit of
the last period zT goes to zero, i.e. the cost of the benefit converges
to the wage.
We finally have to look at the set of feasible entitlements V BT−1
and V GT−1. If z = −∞, so z can take any value, we infer from 32
that the upper bound V
B
t (.) on V
B
t , given V
G
t , is
V
B
t (V
G
t ) = V
G
t .
As for the lower bound, we calculate
V Bt (V
G
t ) = lim
aG→∞
V Gt −∆T−1(aG).
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Now let z > −∞. Then there is a natural lower bound V GT−1,
namely the stochastically discounted sum of the bounds on zT−1
and zT . Given V GT−1 ∈ [V GT−1, 0] we now have to prove that there is
a lower and an upper bound V BT−1(V
G
T−1) and V
B
T−1(V
G
T−1) on the
corresponding feasible V BT−1. Because of 25 the lower bound on zT
translates into an upper bound aG on the corresponding choices
of effort of agent G. It is attained with equality. By 26 and 30 we
find the lower bound
V BT−1(V
G
T−1) = V
G
T−1 −∆T−1(aG).
As for the upper bound V
B
T−1(V
G
T−1), one can see intuitively that
V BT−1 is bounded by V
G
T−1 (for a rigorous argument, see point 1 in
the proof of 3.8). However, V BT−1 does not necessarily attain this
bound, because of an additional constraint: zT−1 ≥ z. From the
LOM and 25 we know
zT−1 = V GT−1 + a
G − pi(a
G)
p′i(aG)
The right hand side is increasing in aG, so a lower bound on zT−1
implies a lower bound on the effort of the second type, aG (note
that because of our normalization, the reference points for each
period have been shifted downwards). Because of 30 a lower bound
on ∆T−1 ensues. Given V GT−1, we thus find the upper bound on
V BT−1:
V
B
T−1(V
G
T−1) = V
G
T−1 −∆T−1(aG).
We see that V BT−1 attains V
G
T−1 only if the lower bound a
G becomes
zero (the smallest possible effort). Since ∆T−1(.) is an increasing
function, we see that all values V BT−1 ∈ [V BT−1, V Bt−1] are attainable
as long as aG > aG. This must be the case for V GT−1 ≥ V GT−1,
since then there are corresponding benefit values zT−1, zT such
that zi ≥ z. Finally, because of the Theorem of the Maximum
both aT−1 and aT−1 depend continuously on V
G
T−1 and since ∆T−1
is a smooth function, the lower and the upper bound V BT−1 and
V
B
T−1 are continuous functions of V
G
T−1.
So for period T − 1, we have shown that the set of feasible
values takes the form stated in the theorem. Note in particular
that this set is compact and connected.
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The Case of t ≤ T− 2 In this paragraph, we prove the asser-
tion 1. As we have stated above, the crucial difference between the
next to last period and the previous ones is the boundary condi-
tion of the last period 12 and 13. Before, for every feasible pair of
state variables (V BT−1, V
G
T−1) -or more precisely, for the difference of
these state variables ∆T−1- there existed one corresponding choice
of effort aGT−1 that determined all choice variables (zT−1, V
B
T , V
G
T ).
As we will see below, now to each pair of feasible state variables
(V Bt−1, V
G
t−1) (again, more precisely, to the difference of these state
variables ∆t−1) there corresponds a line of possible choices of effort
aGt−1 that parameterizes a compact and connected path of choice
variables (zt−1(.), V Bt (.), V
G
t (.)).
We have a look at the LOM once more. With the help of the
agents’ first order condition we transform it into
zt − aB + pB(a
B)
p′B(aB)
= V Bt ,
zt − aG + pG(a
G)
p′G(aG)
= V Gt ,
where again we have dropped the time index from ait. This inspires
the definition of the following functions (i = 1, 2)
fi(a
i) = ai − pi(a
i)
p′i(ai)
.
¿From the LOM we can now derive a necessary equation for the
choice variables (as represented by the ais, replacing the V it s) to
hold:
∆t + fG(a
G) = fB(a
B), (33)
where we have used definition 26.
We have a closer look now at fi. From
f ′i =
pip′′i
(p′i)2
> 0 (34)
we can see that it is a strictly increasing function (bearing in mind
Condition 2.4). Moreover we calculate
lim
ai→0
fi(a
i) = 0, (35)
lim
ai→∞
fi(a
i) = ∞. (36)
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Now note that there is a natural lower bound V Gt on each V
G
t ,
namely the stochastically discounted sum of the ztˆs (where tˆ =
t, ..., T ). In the case of T − 1, we have shown that the set of
jointly feasible values V BT−1, V
G
T−1 takes the form stated in the
theorem. So let Γt(V Bt , V
G
t ) be non-empty and take the form of
a path in the space (zt, V Bt+1, V
G
t+1) for V
B
t ∈ [V Bt (V Gt ), V Bt (V Gt )]
with V Gt ≥ V Gt . We have to show first that then Γt−1(V Bt−1, V Gt−1)
is non-empty for V Bt−1 ∈ [V Bt−1(V Gt ), V Bt−1(V Gt )] for some continuous
functions V Bt−1, V
B
t−1 when V
G
t−1 ≥ V Gt−1 and takes the form of a
path in (zt−1, V Bt , V
G
t ).
Put differently, we have to ask for which pairs (V Bt−1, V
G
t−1) there
are choice variables (zt−1, V Bt , V
G
t ) that are jointly feasible. By the
agents’ first order condition 25 we can replace V Bt and V
G
t by the
corresponding choices of effort aBt−1 and a
G
t−1 (we will drop the
time index in the sequel). The effort choices aB and aG have to
satisfy equation 33. Since ∆t−1 ≥ 0 and by 34, 35 and 36, for
all aG ≥ 0 we can find a corresponding aB ≥ 0. By the LOM,
we can furthermore determine zt−1 once aG is given. Thus the
number of choice variables (zt−1(aG), V Bt (a
G), V Gt (a
G)) is reduced
to the ”choice” variable aG. All functions are combinations of
differentiable functions and thus differentiable. We will call the
projection of the triple of choice variables into the two-dimensional
space (V Bt (a
G), V Gt (a
G)) the curve φ∆t−1 parameterized in a
G.
We have reduced the choice problem to one variable, but which
aG correspond to feasible triples (zt−1, V Bt , V
G
t )? First we look at
the constraint zt−1 ≥ z. As in the preceding paragraph, by the
LOM
zt−1 = V Gt−1 + fG(a
G)
it translates into a constraint 15
aG ≥ aG =
{
f−1G (z − V Gt−1) : V Gt−1 ≤ z
0 : V Gt−1 > z
(37)
Second we have to ask: Which of the pairs of entitlements (V Bt (a
G), V Gt (a
G))
are feasible? Well, those for which Γt(V Bt , V
G
t ) is non-empty. In
other words: Given V Bt−1 and V
G
t−1, the set of feasible choices is the
intersection of the curve φ∆t−1 defined by 33, parameterized in a
G
with aG ≥ aG, and the set of (V Bt , V Gt ) with Γt(V Bt , V Gt ) *= ∅. Fig-
15If z = −∞, by our definition there is no limit on aG.
ure 5 depicts the intersection for the case of period 4 of 12 in an
example from our simulation. The solid lines represent the bounds
V B4 (V
G
4 ) and V
B
4 (V
G
4 ), the dotted and the dashed line are curves
φ∆3 with two different values for ∆3.
Figure 1: Set of jointly feasible entitlements in period 4 of 12
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Two things remain to be shown:
1. we have to show that the set of (V Bt−1, V
G
t−1), for which the in-
tersection is non-empty, takes itself the form of a set bounded
by functions V Bt−1 and V
B
t−1.
2. we have to show that if the curve 33 intersects the set of
feasible values (V Bt , V
G
t ), it cuts the bounds at most twice,
so that the set of feasible choices is connected.
To show the first assertion, we look more closely at the family
of curves
φ∆t−1 : a
G −→ [φB(aG),φG(aG)]∆t−1 ,
where
φB(a
G) =
1
βp′B(f
−1
B (∆t−1 + fG(aG)))
, (38)
φG(a
G) =
1
βp′G(aG)
. (39)
44
Since φG is one-to-one, the curves can also be understood as a
function
V Bt = φ∆t−1(V
G
t ).
We now want to prove the following: The curves are ”decreasing”
in ∆t−1, i.e.
∆t−1 < ∆∗t−1 ⇒ φ∆t−1(V Gt ) > φ∆∗t−1(V Gt ). (40)
We do so by calculating the derivative
∂∆t−1(φ∆t−1)(V
G) = − 1
(βp′1(aB))2
·βp′′1(aB)·
1
f ′θ1(∆t−1 + fθ2(a
G))
< 0,
which is negative because of 34 and Condition 2.4. The property
of φ∆t−1 is reflected by its dotted and the dashed representation
in Figure 5.
By the induction hypothesis, the set of (V Bt , V
G
t ) for which
Γt(V Bt , V
G
t ) *= ∅ is compact and connected. Thus we deduce from
40 that there are ∆t−1 and ∆t−1 so that the curves φ∆t−1 intersect
the set for ∆t−1 ≤ ∆t−1 ≤ ∆t−1 and do not intersect for ∆t−1 <
∆t−1 and ∆t−1 > ∆t−1 (of course ∆t−1 could be smaller than zero,
the lower limit for ∆t−1). From this ensues the existence of two
functions V Bt−1(V
G
t−1) and V
B
t−1(V
G
t−1) limiting the set of feasible
pairs (V Bt−1, V
G
t−1).
To show the second assertion, we have to look more closely
at the shape of the curve φ∆t−1 as well as the limiting functions
V Bt−1(.) and V
B
t−1(.). First, we prove that the derivative of φ∆t−1
is smaller than one. We do so by showing that
D(.) ◦ φ−1G (V Gt−1) := (φG(.)− φB(.)) ◦ φ−1G (V Gt−1)
is increasing in V Gt−1, i.e. the derivative of φ∆t−1 is below the one
of the diagonal:
∂V Gt−1D(φ
−1
G (V
G
t−1)) = 1− ∂V Gt−1φB(φ−1G (V Gt−1)) > 0.
Since we know that
∂V Gt−1(φ
−1
G )(V
G
t−1) < 0
by 25, it is sufficient to show that
D′(aG) < 0.
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Using aB := f−1B (∆t−1 + fG(a
G)) we calculate
D′(aG) = − p
′′
G(a
G)
β(p′G(aG))2
+
p′′B(a
B)
β(p′B(aB))2
· f
′
G(a
G)
f ′B(aB)
= − p
′′
G(a
G)
β(p′G(aG))2
+
p′′B(a
B)
β(p′B(aB))2
· pG(a
G)p′′G(a
G)
(p′G(aG))2
· (p
′
B(a
B))2
pB(aB)p′′B(aB)
=
(
pG(aG)
pB(aB)
− 1
)
· p
′′
G(a
G)
β(p′G(aG))2
.
The last expression is negative by Condition 2.4 and 2.6. Now,
the second assertion follows if we can show that the derivative of
the boundary functions V B(.) and V
B
(.) is greater than one, for
then φ∆t−1 crosses them at most once. So by induction hypothesis,
assume that V Bt (.) and V
B
t (.) have a derivative greater or equal
than one (note that this is certainly true for the case of t = T −1).
According to what we have shown above, there are ∆t−1 and
∆t−1 that limit the set of values ∆t−1 = V
G
t−1 − V Bt−1 for which
φ∆t−1 intersects the set of feasible (V
B
t , V
G
t ). From this we might
be tempted to deduce immediately both V Bt−1 and V
B
t−1 must be
linear functions with derivative one, for apparently the limits only
depend on the difference ∆t−1 = V Gt−1 − V Bt−1. Note, however,
that the starting point aG (see equation 37) for each curve φ∆t−1
is shifting upwards as V Gt−1 is falling. Thus since by induction
hypothesis V Bt and V
B
t are more steeply increasing than the φ∆t−1 ,
we may deduce that
1. indeed V Bt−1(.) is linear with derivative one because the φ∆t−1s
cross the function V Bt (.) at the lower bound V
G
t at a high
value for aG.
2. for lower values of V Gt−1 the smallest ∆t−1 for which φ∆t−1
intersects the set of feasible values (V Bt , V
G
t ) is below the
one that would have been obtained with aG fixed. Since the
latter one would have corresponded to a linear upper bound
V
B
t (.) with derivative one, we conclude that V
B
t (.) has to
rise more steeply than this, i.e. that its derivative is greater
than one.
Thus by induction, we have shown that φ∆t−1 and V
B
t−1(.) and
V
B
t−1(.) cross only once and the second assertion on the form of the
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correspondence Γt−1 ensues. This concludes the proof of Proposi-
tion 3.4.
Proof of Proposition 3.8
Proof. To prove the proposition, we have to show that at the
solution
1. the entitlement constraint 21 of type G is slack,
2. the entitlement constraint 20 of type B is binding,
3. the incentive constraint 19 of type G is binding.
Beginning with 1 we show that for all contracts V G > V B. The
assertion then follows by V b,G > V b,B and agent B’s entitlement
constraint 20.
So we consider a feasible UI contract. Given any set of effort
choices (aB1 , a
B
2 , ..., a
B
T−1) of agent B, the same set of choices would
yield a higher value of total expected lifetime utility for agent G
than for agent B, V G(*aB) > V B(*aB). This is the case because
firstly (total) utility when employed is higher than (total) utility
when unemployed (compare the remarks 3.5 and .1) and secondly
by condition 2.6, first part, pB(aB) > pG(aB) for any aB > 0.
Thus, in particular, at the optimum V G > V B.
We now prove point 2 by contraction. Suppose that for the
solution contracts b, (zb1, ..., z
b
T ), and g, (z
g
1 , ..., z
g
T ), the constraint
20 did not bind. For sufficiently high V we may assume that all
zit > z for all t, in particular for t = 1. But then create new
contracts b’ and g’ by replacing zi1 by z
i
1 − ( (i = b, g) for some
( > 0 with zi1 − ( > z. These contracts are certainly feasible.
They are also incentive compatible, since the entitlements V i,j1 are
reduced by the same amount. However, the new contracts b’ and
g’ are less costly for the principal, since the cost function c(.) is
strictly increasing. Contradiction.
Point 3 is proved by an argument simular to the one in point
2.
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Figure 2: Set of jointly feasible entitlements in period 11 of 12
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y-axis: entitlement of type B, x-axis: entitlement of type G
Figure 3: Set of jointly feasible entitlements in period 8 of 12
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y-axis: entitlement of type B, x-axis: entitlement of type G
∼= Certainty Equivalent of 68.67% of the wage per
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Figure 4: Set of jointly feasible entitlements in period 5 of 12
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Figure 5: Set of jointly feasible entitlements in period 1 of 12
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Figure 6: UI contracts
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y-axis: replacement rate, x-axis: period
Entitlement bound V = −20
∼= Certainty Equivalent of 68.67% of the wage per period
Figure 7: UI contracts
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y-axis: replacement rate, x-axis: period
Entitlement bound V = −25
∼= Certainty Equivalent of 61.76% of the wage per period
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Figure 8: UI contracts
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y-axis: replacement rate, x-axis: period
Entitlement bound V = −30
∼= Certainty Equivalent of 55.21% of the wage per period
Figure 9: UI contracts
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y-axis: replacement rate, x-axis: period
Entitlement bound V = −35
∼= Certainty Equivalent of 49.03% of the wage per period
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Figure 10: UI contracts with q = 0.2
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∼= Certainty Equivalent of 49.03% of the wage per period
Figure 11: UI contracts with q = 0.8
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Entitlement bound V = −35
∼= Certainty Equivalent of 49.03% of the wage per period
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Figure 12: UI contracts with θB = 0.004, θG = 0.017
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Entitlement bound V = −30
∼= Certainty Equivalent of 55.21% of the wage per period
Figure 13: UI contracts with θB = 0.010, θG = 0.017
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∼= Certainty Equivalent of 55.21% of the wage per period
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Figure 14: UI contracts with α = 1.5
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Entitlement bound V = −55.7
∼= Certainty Equivalent of 68.67% of the wage per period
Figure 15: UI contracts with α = 2.5
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Entitlement bound V = −10.3
∼= Certainty Equivalent of 68.67% of the wage per period
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Figure 16: UI contract for two agents, 4 periods
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Entitlement bound V = −23
∼= Certainty Equivalent of 16.60% of the wage per period
Figure 17: UI contract for two agents, 6 periods
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Entitlement bound V = −10.3
∼= Certainty Equivalent of 33.17% of the wage per period
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